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Racial segregation in housing' is a fact of urban life in modem
America.2 Although the phenomenon of residential segregation
most frequently gains attention when the courts fashion remedies
in school desegregation cases,3 its influence on the nation's life is at
1. Sociologists describe the degree of residential segregation by means of the index of
dissimilarity, or segregation index. See, e.g., Kantrowitz, Racial and Ethnic Residential Seg-
regation in Boston 1830-1970, 441 ANNALS 41, 43 (1979). The index is often expressed as a
whole number ranging from 0 (no segregation) to 100 (complete segregation), and reflects
the percentage of a group that would have to move to another location to achieve a distri-
bution throughout each areal unit equal to the group's proportion of the city's population.
Hershberg, Burstein, Ericksen, Greenberg, & Yancey, A Tale of Three Cities: Blacks and Im-
migrants in Philadelphia: 1850-1880, 1930 and 1970, 441 ANNALS 55, 62 n.9 (1979). Re-
searchers generally interpret an index of below 30 as "low" and over 70 as "high."
Kantrowitz, supra at 43. For a thorough discussion of the meaning of a segregation index
number, see K. TAEUBER & A. TAEUBER, NEGROES IN CITIES 28-37 (1965).
2. In 1970, the index of segregation for urban blacks in the United States was 75.
Hershberg, Burstein, Ericksen, Greenberg, & Yancey, supra note 1, at 63. The index in
Boston was somewhat higher at 81. Kantrowitz, supra note 1, at 49. For an overview of
1970 segregation indexes in cities throughout the United States, see Screnson, Taeuber, &
Hollingsworth, Indexes of Racial Residential Segregation for 109 Cities in the United States,
1940 to 1970, 8 Soc. Focus 125, 128-30 (1975).
Since 1970, there has been an increase in the number of blacks leaving urban ghettos
for the suburbs. See Lake, Racial Transition and Black Homeownership in American Suburbs, 441
ANNALS 142, 145 (1979) (number of black suburban households increased by 49% between
1970 and 1976). It appears, however, that the pattern of residential segregation is repeat-
ing itself in suburban neighborhoods. See Farley, The Changing Distribution of Negroes within
Metropolitan Areas: The Emergence of Black Suburbs, 75 AM. J. Soc. 512, 517-18 (1970) (blacks
have clustered in only few of many suburban communities surrounding Chicago). For a
comprehensive yet compact compendium of studies on the subject of race and residence,
see 441 ANNALS 1 (1979).
3. Geographic separation of whites and blacks often means that transporting students
by bus is the most effective method of remedying unlawful segregation in the public
schools. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 30 (1971) (recogniz-
ing busing as effective means of dismantling dual public school system when neighborhood
school assignment would be ineffective).
The courts have asserted that school segregation contributes to the problem of residen-
tial segregation. See, e.g., Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 465 n.13 (1979)
(dismissing petitioner's exculpatory argument that school segregation was caused by resi-
dential segregation and observing that school segregation is "a contributing cause of hous-
ing segregation"). There is disagreement, however, over which way the line of causation
runs. See id. at 480 (Powell, J., dissenting) (segregated schools result "primarily from famil-
iar segregated housing patterns, which-in turn-are caused by social, economic, and de-
mographic forces for which no school board is responsible"); A. BIcKtEL, THE SUPREME
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the same time both less dramatic and more insidious, implicating
issues of health, housing quality, and social insularity.4 In contrast
to this segregated reality, the ideal of stable, racially integrated
neighborhoods is appealing, both in its own right and as an effi-
cient means of integrating the public schools.5 One formidable bar-
rier to integrated communities, however, has been the recurrent
pattern of residential resegregation: a predominantly white neigh-
borhood becomes temporarily integrated, until whites flee, leaving
it predominantly black.
6
Racial housing-access quotas are frequently discussed as a
method for preventing white flight and thus curbing the neighbor-
hood transition process.' Such quotas seek to discourage whites
from leaving a transitional community out of fear that the area
may turn predominantly black; this purpose is accomplished by set-
ting a maximum limit on the number of blacks permitted to enter
COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 131 (1970) (at least in North, school segregation caused
mainly by residential patterns). The courts have also recognized that the same school board
policies that produce school segregation have a segregative effect on residential patterns.
See, e.g., Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 202 (1973) (school board policies on
student and faculty assignment, student transportation, and school construction may have
profound effect on racial makeup of neighborhoods); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd.
of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 21 (1971) (practice of closing down schools in racially mixed areas
and building new ones in areas of predominantly one race "may well promote segregated
residential patterns"). See generally Taeuber, Housing, Schools, and Incremental Segregative Ef-
fects, 441 ANNALS 157 (1979) (discussing complexity of relationship between school and
residential segregation).
4. See S. BERGER, THE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION OF THE
URBAN AMERICAN NEGRO (1970); R. HELPER, RACIAL POLICIES AND PRACTICES OF REAL Es-
TATE BROKERS 7-14 (1969); Marston & Van Valey, The Role of Residential Segregation in the
Assimilation Process, 441 ANNALS 13, 17 (1979).
5. See A. DowNs, OPENING UP THE SUBURBS 26-28 (1973) (integrated neighborhoods
open up job opportunities for blacks); E. GRIER & G. GRIER, PRIVATELY DEVELOPED INTER-
RACIAL HOUSING 194-218 (1960) (beneficial characteristics of several interracial commu-
nities); R. HELPER, supra note 4, at 7-8 (growing recognition that school segregation cannot
be overcome until residential segregation is substantially reduced).
6. K. TAEUBER & A. TAEUBER, supra note 1, at 99-114; Aldrich, Ecological Succession in
Racially Changing Neighborhoods, 10 URB. AFF. Q. 327, 331-45 (1975); see Zuch v. Hussey,
394 F. Supp. 1028, 1049 (E.D. Mich. 1975) (describing course of events in residential
neighborhood when it becomes racially transitional).
7. See Ackerman, Integration for Subsidized Housing and the Question of Racial Occupancy
Controls, 26 STAN. L. REV. 245 (1974); Hellerstein, The Benign Quota, Equal Protection, and
"The Rule in Shelley's Case," 17 RUTGERS L. REV. 531 (1963); Kaplan, Equal Justice in an Un-
equal World: Equality for the Negro-The Problem of Special Treatment, 61 Nw. U.L. REV. 363,
388-98 (1966); Navasky, The Benevolent Housing Quota, 6 How. L.J. 30 (1960); Rubinowitz &
Trosman, Affirmative Action and the American Dream: Implementing Fair Housing Policies in Fed-
eral Homeownership Programs, 74 Nw. U.L. REV. 491, 533-65 (1979); Developments in the
Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1104-20 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Develop-
ments]; Note, The Use of Racial Housing Quotas To Achieve Integrated Communities: The Oak
Park Approach, 6 Loy. CHI. L.J. 164 (1975); cf. Otero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 484
F.2d 1122, 1140 (2d Cir. 1973) (validating use of racial access quotas in public housing
project to prevent neighborhood tipping).
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that community." These quotas have been heavily criticized on sev-
eral grounds. Because many variables affect the residential transi-
tion process, 9 arriving at an appropriate quota is difficult. Further-
more, even if accuracy were possible, the quotas run into
substantial equal protection problems because they absolutely ex-
clude persons from housing on the basis of race.'0
This Note suggests a reverse-steering device as an alternative to
the access quota. Although this alternative is also race-conscious, it
is less restrictive of individual housing choices than the access
quota, and is potentially as effective at maintaining stable, racially
integrated neighborhoods. The Note begins by describing the neigh-
borhood resegregation process and outlining the access quota that
has in the past been put forward to stem that process. The Note
then describes the reverse-steering alternative and sets out the rele-
vant legal criteria for determining whether such a device comports
with existing statutory and constitutional law. Finally, the Note de-
tails the procedural and substantive features of an affirmative mar-
keting proposal that would comply with these criteria.
I. Residential Transition: Problems and Solutions
Sociologists have called the phenomenon of neighborhood re-
segregation the tipping process, a label that reflects the rapid and
seemingly irreversible transition from white to black that afflicts
many neighborhoods. Underlying the label is a theory explaining
racial transition in terms of the relative numbers of blacks and
whites in a given community. The tipping theory posits that every
community has a "tipping point," a specifiable numerical ratio of
blacks to whites beyond which the rate of white migration out of a
transitional area will increase rapidly, eventually yielding a pre-
dominantly black community"
8. See Navasky, supra note 7, at 31-32.
9. See Goering, Neighborhood Tipping and Racial Transition: A Review of Social Science Evi-
dence, 44 A.i. INST. PLAN. J. 68 (1978) (describing various forces at metropolitan, neigh-
borhood, and personal levels that contribute to residential transition).
10. See p. 381 infra (quotas conflict with personal-rights interpretation of Fourteenth
Amendment).
1 I. Goering, supra note 9, at 68. The term "tipping" was coined by Morton Grodzins.
See Grodzins, Metropolitan Segregation, SCIENTIFIC AM., Oct. 1957, at 24, 33-41.
Estimates on the tipping point vary. See, e.g., Goering, supra note 9, at 68 (modern stud-
ies claiming existence of general tipping point between 25% and 30% black); Navasky, su-
pra note 7, at 34-35 (citing early studies claiming tipping points ranging from 20% to 60%
black). Of the numerous tipping models that have been constructed to enable accurate pre-
dictions of the probable tipping sequence in a given community, the most persuasive is
Professor Schelling's. See Schelling, A Process of Residential Segregation: Neighborhood Tipping,
in ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY LAW 307 (B. Ackerman ed. 1975). Schelling's
model begins by postulating that every white individual in a given community possesses a
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The device most commonly considered in the literature as an ef-
fective means of maintaining integration in transitional com-
munities is the racial access quota.1 2 Such a quota establishes an up-
per limit on the percentage of blacks permitted to reside in a given
neighborhood, a limit set just short of the tipping point. Its propo-
nents speculate that the quota would effectively prevent
resegregation by keeping the number of blacks just below the point
at which mass white exodus is expected to occur. 13
The racial access quota has prompted both constitutional and
statutory objections. Some commentators have argued that Title
VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968,'4 both on its face and in its
underlying policy, bars the use of racial quotas in housing regard-
less of the state interest in integration.15 Others have argued that
"personal tipping point" that indicates the level of black occupation of the neighborhood at
which that individual will decide to leave. Id. at 309. Schelling then describes the neighbor-
hood tipping point as a particular place on the cumulative distribution curve of "personal
tipping points"-the place where the level of black occupants generates a "self-sustaining
process of white departure." Id. at 314. According to this model, two factors are crucial to
the determination of the probable succession pattern in a given neighborhood: first, the in-
dividual attitudes of whites in the community must be measurable; and second, for the
process to become irreversible there must be a sufficient black demand for housing in the
transitional community for the vacancies created by departing whites to be filled by
blacks.
The suitability of the tipping model of neighborhood transition has been criticized in two
ways. First, at least in some communities, the resegregation process follows a gradual
rather than an abrupt pattern. See Aldrich, supra note 6, at 342 (once succession process
begins, it follows continuous line of expansion). Second, even when neighborhoods do tip,
the factual variables are so numerous and intertwined as to make universally accurate pre-
dictions of a specific tipping point difficult. See Goering, supra note 9, at 69. Schelling's
model meets these criticisms, however. Even though the rate of community transition may
be continuous, Schelling's analysis demonstrates that, given certain distributions of individ-
ual tipping points, the process will become irreversible at some point. Moreover, his model
takes into account the variables of different levels of white tolerance and black demand.
Schelling's model has yet to be employed in predicting the probable pattern of residen-
tial succession in an actual neighborhood. Existing evidence nevertheless corroborates the
validity of the model's emphasis on both white attitudes toward interracial living and black
demand for housing in the transitional community. National surveys demonstrate that the
racial attitudes of white persons influence their decision to move. See, e.g., Pettigrew, Atti-
tudes on Race and Housing, in SEGREGATION IN RESIDENTIAL AREAS 21, 25 (A. Hawley & V.
Rock eds. 1973) (71% of responding whites would or might move if blacks moved into
their neighborhood in "great numbers"). In addition, it has been empirically demonstrated
that the closer a neighborhood is to a predominantly nonwhite area, the greater the proba-
bility of racial transition. See Goering, supra note 9, at 74. The clear inference is that black
demand for housing is greater in racially changing neighborhoods. The practical analysis
in Part III of this Note assumes both the empirical validity of a model such as Schelling's
and the possibility of gathering the type of evidence necessary reasonably to demonstrate
the probability of neighborhood tipping in a given area. See pp. 397-98 infra.
12. See p. 378 supra; cf. Goering, supra note 9, at 68-69 (noting how federal courts have
discussed possibility of using access quotas to prevent tipping).
13. See Navasky, supra note 7, at 31.
14. Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1976).
15. See Frederick, The Legality of Affirmative Measures to Achieve and Maintain Integration
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the racial housing quota is inconsistent with existing equal protec-
tion law.1 6 Housing quotas arguably violate the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because they stigmatize indi-
vidual blacks refused housing for racial reasons17 and because
there are other less restrictive measures available to prevent neigh-
borhood transition.1
8
An alternative to the access quota as a means of preventing
neighborhood resegregation is a device known as affirmative mar-
keting.19 This device would employ an ordinance requiring real es-
in a New Town, 59 GEO. L.J. 335, 348-49, 353 (1970); cf. Rubinowitz & Trosman, supra note
7, at 543-49, 561-62 (policy thrust of Title VIII aimed at protecting homeseekers' freedom
of choice rather than promoting integrated neighborhoods).
16. See Note, supra note 7, at 167-68 (constitutionality of quota plan improbable under
"personal rights" interpretation of equal protection clause).
17. Cf. Bittker, The Case of the Checker-Board Ordinance: An Experiment in Race Relations, 71
YALE L.J. 1387, 1396, 1419 (1962) (even most well-intended legislation aimed at residential
integration may humiliate individual blacks denied housing pursuant to that legislation);
Note, supra note 7, at 169-70 (quotas may have detrimental psychological effect).
18. See Note, supra note 7, at 179-83 (suggesting nondiscriminatory alternatives that
would be constitutionally preferable to quotas).
One equal protection argument made against quotas relies on the "personal rights" inter-
pretation of the Fourteenth Amendment expounded in Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22
(1948). The Court in Shelley, in declaring that state court enforcement of a racially restrict-
ive covenant was an unconstitutional state action under the Fourteenth Amendment, an-
nounced that the rights created by the Fourteenth Amendment are guaranteed to the indi-
vidual. Id. at 20, 22. This Shelley doctrine has been applied to the housing-access quota to
argue that the denial of housing to a person because of race violates his guaranteed right
to be treated as an individual. See Note, supra note 7, at 167-68.
Two state court cases have ruled the housing-access quota unconstitutional based on a
personal rights interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Banks v. Housing Auth.,
120 CaT. App. 2d 1, 260 P.2d 668 (1953); Taylor v. Leonard, 30 N.J. Super. 116, 103 A.2d
632 (1954). In Otero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1122 (2d Cir. 1973), how-
ever, a court upheld the use of racial access quotas in public housing projects to prevent
neighborhood tipping. Id. at 1140. The court found the city housing authority's duty
to promote residential integration under section 808(e)(5) of Title VIII, 42 U.S.C. §
3608(d)(5) (1976), to be more important than its duty to prevent discrimination. 484 F.2d
at 1133-34.
The most recent Supreme Court explication of the Shelley doctrine can be found in Re-
gents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). In an opinion announcing the
judgment of the Court, Justice Powell acknowledged that the personal right not to be
treated differently on the basis of race by state action was not absolute. He asserted that
such infringements instead entitle the individual to a demonstration that the racial classifi-
cation is "necessary to promote a substantial state interest." Id. at 320 (Powell, J.). This
Note argues that, in light of Justice Powell's suggestion that an admissions plan like that of
Harvard College is constitutional, the Fourteenth Amendment personal right, in the con-
text of affirmative action programs, is a right not to be stigmatized by an otherwise benev-
olent racial classification. See pp. 390-93 infra.
19. The term "affirmative marketing" has been used in two separate contexts. In one
instance, it has been employed to describe voluntary "affirmative marketing agreements"
between local community housing associations and real estate brokers selling houses in the
area. Brokers who sign such agreements promise to market houses in the neighborhood
with an intent to promote residential integration. See J. WUNKER, W. SCOTT, D. DEMARCO,
& D. ONDERDONK, AFFIRMATIVE MARKETING HANDBOOK: A GUIDE TO INTEGRATED HOUSING
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tate brokers to market houses in a transitional community to white
buyers and to direct black customers to houses outside the tipping
neighborhood. The affirmative marketing device would not place
strict quotas on the number of black residents in the transitional
community, but would be a means of assuring that the number of
white homebuyers approximately equals that of white homesellers.2 °
Rather than barring access, it would attempt to influence demand.
The legal status of affirmative marketing is at present unclear.
Like the racial access quota, the affirmative marketing device re-
quires treating homebuyers differently on the basis of race and
thus might arguably conflict with the language and policy of Title
VIII. 21 Moreover, because the device employs racial classifications,
it must be reconciled with constitutionally prescribed equal protec-
tion principles. 22 Despite these obstacles, a device can be outlined
that, in certain circumstances, comports with applicable statutory
and constitutional law.
II. The Statutory and Constitutional Criteria
Tite VIII and the Fourteenth Amendment set out the legal
principles guiding race-conscious government regulation like the
affirmative marketing device. 23 Although these principles place
11.4-11.18 (1979). The term has also been used by the Department of Housing and Urban
Development in its regulations governing private developers receiving FHA assistance. See
24 C.F.R. §§ 200.600-.640 (1980). The regulations require these developers to submit an
"affirmative marketing" plan to HUD indicating how they intend to promote integrated
housing in developments that are backed by federal funds.
This Note employs the term "affirmative marketing" to describe a device that local
communities might adopt as a means of preventing racial transition. The device is set out
in detail below. See pp. 395-96 infra. The Note uses the term "reverse-steering" to describe
the particular real estate broker practice required under the affirmative marketing device.
20. Although the affirmative marketing device does not employ a strict racial quota, it
nevertheless relies on a tipping model of neighborhood transition. The device would not be
employed until it could be shown, using empirical evidence, that an imminent tipping
threat existed. See pp. 397-98 infra. The affirmative marketing device would arguably be
effective at preventing residential transition by keeping white buyer demand at a sufficient
level to maintain the ratio of whites to blacks in substantial equipoise. See C. RAPKIN & W.
GRIGSBY, THE DEMAND FOR HOUSING IN RACIALLY MIXED AREAS 52 (1960) (sustaining white
demand is single most important factor necessary to maintain stability of racially mixed
areas).
21. See Note, Racial Steering: The Real Estate Broker and Title VIII, 85 YALE L.J. 808, 823
n.57 (1976) (unlawful to steer buyers on basis of race even to foster integration).
22. Like the racial access quota, the affirmative marketing device involves racial classifi-
cations that infringe on a person's freedom to be treated without regard to race. For this
reason they are subject to the various equal protection analyses presented in the opinions
in Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). See pp. 388-90 infra.
23. In addition, section 1982 of Title 42 of the United States Code, guaranteeing equal
property rights to all citizens regardless of race, has been applied to cases involving racial
discrimination in the sale or rental of housing. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park,
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substantial burdens of justification upon the municipality adopting
such a device, they would legitimate affirmative marketing when
it is used in certain circumstances.
A. Title VIII
Section 804 of Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 196824 makes
it unlawful "to refuse to sell or rent... or otherwise make unavail-
able or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race.''25 This sec-
tion has been interpreted to proscribe a set of real estate brokerage
practices known as steering. 26 Steering includes the practices of
misrepresenting for racial reasons the availability of housing that
meets a buyer's specification,2 7 showing houses only in neighbor-
hoods composed predominantly of the buyer's race, 28 and in-
fluencing a buyer to choose housing on a racial basis. 29 In every
steering case that has arisen, however, the marketing practices in
question have tended to foster rather than retard racial segregation
in housing.3° No court has specifically addressed the question
Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969); Jones v. Alfred Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968). This Note fo-
cuses on Title VIII as the appropriate statutory guide for the affirmative marketing de-
vice; it is assumed that the antidiscrimination prohibitions in section 1982 are no more re-
strictive than those in Title VIII. Cf. Comment, Fair Housing-The Use of Testers to Enforce
Fair Housing Laus-When Testers are Sued, 21 ST. Louis U. L.J. 170, 174 (1977) (most courts
recognize that Title VIII is alternative to section 1982 as means of achieving equal housing
opportunity).
The content of each statute supports the view that Title VIII is the proper guide in the
case of affirmative marketing. Whereas section 1982 specifies neither the type of party nor
property to which it should apply, Title VIII contains provisions clearly directed toward
the activities of real estate brokers. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(d) (1976) (antiblockbusting provi-
sion making it unlawful to misrepresent availability of housing solely because of race of
buyer or renter); id. § 3606 (prohibiting discrimination in provision of brokerage services).
In addition, Title VIII applies by its terms to "dwelling" units. See id. § 3604.
24. Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1976).
25. Id. § 3604(a).
26. See Zuch v. Hussey, 394 F. Supp. 1028, 1047 (E.D. Mich. 1975). The courts concur
in the following definition of steering: "Unlawful steering or channeling of a prospective
buyer is the use of a word or phrase or action by a real estate broker or salesperson which
is intended to influence the choice of a prospective property buyer on a racial basis." Id.
(citing United States v. Robbins, 1 Eq. Opp. Hous. Cas. 14,264 (S.D. Fla. 1974)).
27. See United States v. Robbins, 1 Eq. Opp. Hous. Cas. 14,264 (S.D. Fla. 1974). Such
misrepresentations are explicitly prohibited by Title VIII. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(d) (1976).
28. See Fair Hous. Council v. Eastern Bergen County Multiple Listing Serv., Inc., 422
F. Supp. 1071, 1075-76 (D.N.J. 1976). This practice has been termed "matching steering." See
Note, supra note 21, at 817-18.
29. See Zuch v. Hussey, 394 F. Supp. 1028, 1048 (E.D. Mich. 1975).
30. See Fair Hous. Council v. Eastern Bergen County Multiple Listing Serv., Inc., 422
F. Supp. 1071, 1075-76 (D.N.J. 1976) (noting how realtor discriminations mislead buyers in
way that preserves or extends segregated housing patterns); Zuch v. Hussey, 394 F. Supp.
1028, 1048 (E.D. Mich. 1975) (racial steering that denies housing to blacks perpetuates
residential segregation); United States v. Robbins, 1 Eq. Opp. Hous. Cas. 14,264,
14,264-65 (S.D. Fla. 1974) (defendant's steering practices contributed to resegregation of
383
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whether a reverse-steering practice-that is, one that promotes res-
idential integration-is legal.31
The legislative history of Title VIII does not settle the question.
It indicates that a primary congressional intention in passing the
legislation was to break up residential concentrations of minorities
and to foster integrated living patterns. 32 Furthermore, the history
shows that at the time Title VIII was enacted, it was believed that
strict adherence to the policy embodied in its antidiscrimination
provisions could only promote this policy of antisegregaion. 33
Congress probably never conceived of, let alone addressed, the
question of which policy must yield when the two conflict.34 In the
case of a transitional neighborhood that is likely to tip absent some
kind of race-conscious practice by real estate brokers, therefore, it
is fair to say that Congress never resolved whether the anti-
discrimination or the antisegregation policy should prevail.
neighborhood); cf. United States v. Mitchell, 580 F.2d 789, 791 (5th Cir. 1978) (de facto
segregation in apartment complex declared highly probative of section 3604(a) violation).
31. The absence of case precedent on the issue is probably due to the unlikelihood that
such reverse steering has ever been practiced by real estate brokers.
32. See 114 CONG. REC. 3422 (1968) (remarks of Sen. Mondale) (one result of Fair
Housing Act would be that "rapid, block-by-block expansion of the ghetto will be slowed
and replaced by truly integrated and balanced living patterns"). In addition, Congress in-
tended to promote freedom of choice in housing and to prevent humiliation resulting
from racially discriminatory housing practices. See id. at 5643 (remarks of Sen. Mondale)
(Title VIII gives blacks freedom to move where they will and "removes the opportunity to
insult and discriminate against a fellow American because of his color"); cf. Dubofsky, Fair
Housing: A Legislative History and a Perspectitle, 8 WASHBURN L.J. 149, 153-54 (1969) (in
passing Fair Housing Act, Congress intended to help blacks escape ghettos and find better
housing, jobs, and educational opportunities). The courts have acknowledged the congres-
sional intention to promote residential integration through Title VIII. See, e.g., Linmark
Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 94-95 (1977).
33. See Rubinowitz & Trosman, supra note 7, at 538 n.178 (Senator Mondale's com-
ments indicate that integrated living patterns were expected outcome of fair-housing provi-
sions protecting individual choice); Note, supra note 21, at 822 (proponents of fair-housing
legislation sought to attain, inter alia, residential integration by ending racial discrimination
in housing).
34. See Ackerman, supra note 7, at 303. In Otero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 484
F.2d 1122 (2d Cir. 1973), the court resolved this conflict in favor of the antisegregation
policy. See id. at 1134, 1140 (housing authority may limit number of public housing units
available to persons on basis of race if necessary to preserve racially balanced community).
The court declared that the city housing authority's affirmative obligation to promote resi-
dential integration under section 808(e)(5) of Tide VIII, 42 U.S.C. § 3608(d)(5) (1976),
outweighed its antidiscrimination duty under the statute. Id. at 1133-34. Because no provi-
sion of Title VIII imposes a similar affirmative duty on private real estate brokers, the de-
cision fails to resolve the issue of the legality of an affirmative marketing device in the pri-
vate sector. Note, supra note 21, at 823 n.57; cf. United States v. Real Estate One, Inc., 433
F. Supp. 1140, 1150 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (although realtor has statutory duty not to promote
segregation, he has no duty to integrate). The issue addressed in this Note, however, is not
whether Title VIII itself imposes an affirmative duty to integrate on private real estate
brokers, but rather whether it permits the local community to impose such a duty.
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In the absence of clear guidance under Title VIII, valid legal cri-
teria for affirmative marketing practices in housing may be derived
from legal principles developed under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.35 The ends and the means employed are similar in the
two civil rights statutes: a general prohibition against racial discrim-
ination was intended to foster greater black participation in the
mainstream of American life. Like Title VIII, Title VII embodies a
policy of improving the general quality of life for blacks in
America. 36 Congress hoped that the antidiscrimination provisions
in Title VII, which outlaw racially discriminatory practices in pri-
vate employment, would effectively promote this policy by opening
up meaningful job opportunities historically closed to black em-
ployees.
37
The courts have held that certain of Title VII's anti-
discrimination provisions can be suspended in favor of its broader
policies.33 Section 703(d) of Title VII, which prohibits racial dis-
35. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976). It has been argued that for purposes of
determining the legality of race-conscious housing marketing practices, the anti-
discrimination prohibitions in Title VIII should be interpreted as coterminous with those
in the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, much as Title VI was treated
in Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 287 (1978) (Powell, J.). See Note,
Benign Steering and Benign Quotas: The Validity of Race-Conscious Government Policies to Promote
Residential Integration, 93 HARv. L. REv. 938, 948-49 (1980). Such an interpretation by anal-
ogy is unpersuasive. Unlike Title VI, Title VIII has in fact already been interpreted as
more prohibitive than the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. While
discriminatory intent must be proved as a prerequisite to a finding of a constitutional viola-
tion, see Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976), "discriminatory impact" is suffi-
cient to establish a "prima facie case" of a statutory violation under Title VIII, see Metro-
politan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1918). These standards are not applicable in the context
of a benevolent, race-conscious device such as affirmative marketing. The difference be-
tween constitutional and statutory standards of prohibitiveness does, however, necessitate a
separate treatment of Title VIII in discussing the legality of an affirmative marketing
practice.
36. Compare 110 CONG. REc. 6548 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey) (Tide VII de-
signed to give blacks "a fair chance to earn a livelihood and contribute their talents to the
building of a more prosperous America") and id. at 6552 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey) (Ti-
de VII assures departure from misery and bitterness that is lot of so many black Ameri-
cans) with 114 CONG. REc. 2274 (1968) (remarks of Sen. Mondale) (fair-housing legislation
basic keystone to improving plight of minorities confined to "ghetto jails").
37. See 110 CONG. REC. 6548 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey) (crux of solution to
plight of blacks in America's economy is to open up employment opportunities tradi-
tionally closed to them).
38. See United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (holding section
703(d) of Title VII, prohibiting racial discrimination in job advancement programs, no bar
to private affirmative action programs that are consistent with general goals of Title VII);
Edmondson v. United States Steel Corp., 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1745 (N.D. Ala. 1979)
(apprenticeship preference programs for blacks and females do not violate Title VII); cf.
Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. Young, 608 F.2d 671 (6th Cir. 1979), petition for cert. filed,
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crimination in the admission of employees to training or appren-
ticeship programs, is not a bar to such discriminatory practices
when used by private employers in voluntary affirmative action
programs designed to eliminate racial imbalances in tradi-
tionally segregated job categories. 40  In upholding such race-
conscious practices, the Supreme Court has relied primarily on the
legislative history of Tide VII, arguing that the congressional in-
tention to expand minority employment opportunities supports the
use of racial quotas in job training programs. 41 It has been pointed
out, however, that certain portions of the legislative history indicate
that several members of Congress explicitly opposed a pro-quota
interpretation of Title VII.42 In the face of this ambiguity, the
Court has emphasized both the temporary nature of affirmative
employment programs and the fact that they do not severely tram-
mel the advancement interests of white employees.43
Several considerations suggest that the courts should apply these
Title VII principles in determining the legality of affirmative mar-
48 U.S.L.W. 3466 (Jan. 10, 1980) (No. 79-1080) (affirmative hiring program in city police
department violates neither Tide VII nor Fourteenth Amendment).
The courts have not limited their approval of race-conscious employment practices to the
context of voluntary affirmative action programs. Many courts have relied on section
706(g) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976), the remedial section of the statute, in
upholding court-ordered hiring and promotional quotas as remedies to proven violations
of the antidiscrimination provisions of Tide VII. See, e.g., Davis v. County of Los Angeles,
566 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1977), vacated as moot, 440 U.S. 625 (1979) (upholding remedial
hiring quota); EEOC v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 556 F.2d 167 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
438 U.S. 915 (1978) (upholding remedial promotional quota).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(d) (1976).
40. United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 197 (1979).
41. See id. at 204. Given that one of Congress' primary intentions in passing Title VII
was to improve the job situation for blacks, the Weber Court considered that it would be
ironic to interpret the statute as prohibiting race-conscious efforts aimed at abolishing pat-
terns of racial segregation and hierarchy in the work force. See id. The Court in Weber also
relied on section 703(j) of Title VII, a provision specifying that nothing in the statute
should be interpreted to require employers to grant preferential treatment to employees
because of race. The Court inferred that since Congress did not prohibit affirmative action
in this section, it meant to permit it when done voluntarily. See id. at 204-07.
42. See id. at 237 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting remarks of Senator Humphrey)
(Title VII would prohibit preferential treatment for any particular group); id. at 239-40
(quoting remarks of Senators Clark and Case) (under Title VII employers would not be
permitted to give special preference to blacks in hiring or in seniority rights); cf. id. at
212-13 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (acknowledging Rehnquist's assertion that Congress
probably thought it was adopting principle of nondiscrimination applying to blacks and
whites alike).
43. See id. at 208-09.
44. There are two important distinctions between the preferential programs in Weber
and the affirmative marketing device. These distinctions are not, however, fatal to the
analogy.
First, unlike the preferential hiring program, an affirmative marketing device arguably
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keting practices under Title VIII. 4 4 As in the case of Title VII, the
explicit prohibition against discrimination in Title VIII would be
suspended to promote its antisegregation policy.45 If adopted only
when necessary to prevent residential transition, the affirmative
marketing device would clearly promote the antisegregation policy
of Title VIII. Indeed, the case for a temporary suspension of the
antidiscrimination policy under Title VIII is even more compelling
in the context of neighborhood tipping, where a failure to instigate
some kind of race-conscious device would ex hypothesi result in seg-
regation, than in the employment context, where a simple color-
would infringe on the interests of black individuals steered away from the transitional
neighborhood. Just as the preferential program did not, however, unnecessarily infringe
on the job advancement interests of whites, so too the affirmative marketing device would
not significantly interfere with the black buyer's freedom to acquire suitable housing. The
analogy would be closer if the affirmative marketing device mandated that black buyers be
steered away from the transitional community only when housing that met their specifica-
tions existed in other neighborhoods. See p. 395 infra (describing how affirmative market-
ing device assumes that suitable housing alternatives are available to black buyers); cf.
Barrick Realty, Inc. v. City of Gary, 491 F.2d 161, 164-65 (7th Cir. 1974) (clearly consistent
with federal housing policy for city to promote integration and discourage resegregation
even if effect is to reduce number of blacks moving into certain areas of city).
Moreover, the affirmative marketing device arguably would work for the long-term in-
terests of all blacks, both those within the transitional community and those steered away
from it. Black residents of the community would benefit from a stable, integrated neigh-
borhood, and black buyers would have the option of moving into predominantly white
communities, thus opening up new neighborhoods to possible racial integration. See
Ackerman, supra note 7, at 291-93 (racial occupancy controls arguably maximize satisfac-
tion of black family housing preferences).
The other distinction between the two affirmative action devices is that the preferential
hiring program in Weber involved purely private action, 443 U.S. at 200, whereas the af-
firmative marketing device, in the form of a state housing regulation indicating guidelines
for approval of a local affirmative marketing ordinance, would be state action for purposes
of Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence. This distinction is important only in that it sub-
jects the affirmative marketing device to constitutional tests not applied to the private acts
in Veber. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 173 (1970) (noting in dictum that
law whose source is town ordinance may offend Fourteenth Amendment even though it
has less than statewide application); Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 479-80 (1968)
(equal protection clause reaches exercise of state power however manifested, whether exer-
cised directly or through subdivisions of state). This Note argues that the device would
pass constitutional muster under certain conditions. See pp. 394-95 infra.
45. Suspension of the antidiscrimination policy in favor of the antisegregation policy in
Title VIII yields benefits for blacks that are similar to those fostered by preferential treat-
ment programs in the employment context. These include a better quality of life, increased
economic and social opportunities, and an overall integration of blacks into the mainstream
of American society. See, e.g., United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193,
202-03 (1979). Moreover, the fact that courts have transferred the "prima facie case" doc-
trine originally adopted in Title VII employment discrimination cases to housing discrimi-
nation cases under Title VIII, see Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington
Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1288-90 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978), sug-
gests that they will look to Title VII cases for additional doctrinal guidance in the context
of race-conscious affirmative marketing cases.
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blind hiring policy might eventually produce the desired integra-
tion in the work force.46
Furthermore, unlike the legislative history of Title VII on the
question of employment quotas, the legislative history of Title VIII
contains no statements explicitly prohibiting race-conscious broker
activity that promotes integration. 47 The legislative intent argu-
ment is thus, on balance, less of a barrier to the affirmative market-
ing device under Title VIII than it has been to quota plans already
upheld under Title VII.
The Title VII cases also indicate that any remaining ambiguities
in the policies and legislative history of Title VII should be re-
solved in favor of the affirmative marketing device if it comports
with certain equitable criteria established in the employment quota
cases. 4 8 A device that did not substantially restrict the housing op-
portunities open to prospective black buyers would thus be respon-
sive to the courts' concern under Title VII that individual interests
be protected.49 Moreover, if the device were used only as an in-
terim measure to prevent an imminent tipping threat, it would
satisfy the concern that such measures be temporary.
50
B. The Fourteenth Amendment
Traditional equal protection doctrine posits that although all ra-
cial classifications are not invalid per se, 51 they are inherently "sus-
pect" and are thus subject to the strictest judicial scrutiny of both
the end sought and the means employed. 52 The strict scrutiny doc-
46. To the extent that a lack of minority representation in the work force has been
caused primarily by past discriminatory employer practices, the adoption of a pure
colorblind standard would eliminate the primary barrier to what could become, over time,
a substantially integrated employment force.
47. See p. 385 supra.
48. These criteria include the temporariness of the device and the degree to which it
protects individual job advancement interests so as to prevent feelings of racial resentment.
See United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979).
49. Indeed, it is arguable that those job advancement interests of white employees in-
fringed by the preferential treatment program are more established and thus when in-
fringed more likely to produce resentment than the black homebuyers' interests in living in
a specific neighborhood. Cf. J. KAIN & J. QUIGLEY, HOUSING MARKETS AND RACIAL Dis-
CRIMINATION: A MICROECONOmiC ANALYSIS 26 (1975) (people choose housing according to
"bundle" of desired attributes; location is only one of several characteristics determining
residential choices). Any reverse-steering device that automatically restricted the black buy-
er's housing opportunities to predominantly black neighborhoods, however, would be
counter to that buyer's interests.
50. See note 48 supra.
51. See United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 171 (1977) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part); Ackerman, supra note 7, at 271; Developments, supra note 7, at 1106.
52. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291 (1978) (Powell, J.) (ra-
cial distinctions of any sort inherently suspect and thus call for most exacting judicial ex-
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trine suspends normal judicial deference to legislative acts53 and
forces the court to investigate the closeness of the fit between the
allegedly legitimate purpose and the means adopted to achieve it.5
4
Before courts began to consider race-conscious affirmative action
plans, the strict scrutiny test was nearly always fatal to what were
usually invidious racial classifications.55
When racial classifications voluntarily adopted by a public or pri-
vate entity are employed as a means of benefiting a minority
group rather than as a tool for subjugation or segregation, the
courts should replace the traditional means-ends test of strict scru-
tiny with a group-stigmatizing test. Under such a test, the court,
once confident that a particular legislative or administrative device
will in fact benefit a minority group, inquires into whether the ra-
amination); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9 (1967) (state bears heavy burden of justifi-
cation of all racial classifications). For a general discussion of the doctrine of suspect classi-
fications, see Developments, supra note 7, at 1087-88.
53. See Note, Mental Disability and the Right to Vote, 88 YALE L.J. 1644, 1648 (1979).
54. See Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHILOSOPHY & PUB. AtF. 107,
113-14 (1976). Under standard strict scrutiny analysis as applied to racial classifications, if
the means employed to achieve a particular state purpose are not "precisely tailored" to the
end sought, then the law is invalid. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,
299 (1978) (Powell, J.).
In the school desegregation cases, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ.,
402 U.S. I (1971), racial classifications employed by school officials to comply with court-
ordered remedies for past constitutional violations are not deemed "suspect," and are thus
not subject to judicial scrutiny. See Developments, supra note 7, at 1105 n.171 (in school
cases, constitutionality of classification already confirmed by court ordering desegregation,
so implementation of plan involves no independent constitutional inquiry). Similarly, strict
scrutiny is avoided when public housing officials adopt race-conscious policies as a means
of undoing the effects of past discriminatory behavior. See Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284
(1976); United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422
U.S. 1042 (1975); Shannon v. United States Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 436 F.2d 809
(3d Cir. 1970).
55. See Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine
on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1, 8 (1972)
(strict scrutiny is "'strict' in theory and fatal in fact"). A general discussion of the evolution
of the strict scrutiny test is beyond the scope of this Note. It must be noted, however, that
the existing test goes beyond a scrutiny of the causal fit between ends and means and inev-
itably forces the court to balance society's interest in achieving an arguably legitimate goal
against a particular individual's interest in being treated as a human being without regard
to race. See Developments, supra note 7, at 1103-04.
The two aspects of the suspect classification analysis, scrutiny of fit and balancing of in-
terests, are illustrated in Justice Powell's opinion in Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265 (1978). In that opinion, Justice Powell scrutinized the fit between the use of
racial admissions quotas and the goal of eliminating the effects of identified racial discrimi-
nation; he concluded that the university had not proven that the racially classificatory
means was responsive to the effects of the discrimination. Id. at 309-10. In addition, Justice
Powell asserted that because the admissions quota plan infringed so severely on an individ-
ual's rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, the school's goal of attaining racial diversity
per se was not sufficient to outweigh the harm to the individual. Id. at 315-20.
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cial classification employed will stigmatize any individual on the ba-
sis of race.
56
Such a theory of judicial review in the context of benevolent ra-
cial classifications is supported by the opinions in several recent
cases. 57 The group-stigmatizing doctrine was enunciated outright
in the case of Regents of the University of California v. Bakke58 by the
56. The "group-stigmatizing" test obviously necessitates a precise definition of the con-
cept of stigma. This Note adopts the definition of stigma proffered by the Brennan-group
in Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 357-58 (1978) (racial classifications
stigmatize when they presume inferiority of one race or when they put weight of govern-
ment behind racial hatred and separatism).
57. The principal support for the group-stigmatizing theory is found in the opinions in
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). In addition, the Court in
United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979), demonstrated a similar
tendency to focus on stigma-type concerns. There the Court underscored the fact that the
craft-training affirmative action program was temporary and did not significantly trammel
the advancement interests of white employees as preventative protections against
producing racial hostility or resentment. See id. at 208. Moreover, in Fullilove v. Klutznick,
100 S. Ct. 2758 (1980), Justice Marshall adopted the group-stigmatizing theory in support
of the minority business set-aside provision of the Public Works Employment Act of 1977,
42 U.S.C. § 6705(f)(2) (Supp. III 1979). 100 S. Ct. at 2795-97. In dissent, both Justices
Stewart and Stevens acknowledged the import of stigma-type concerns, but disagreed with
Justice Marshall that such harms would likely result from the set-aside provision. Id. at
2802-03 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (preferential programs reinforce common stereotypes of
groups as unable to achieve without special protection and encourage private discrimina-
tion by fostering notions of racial entitlement); id. at 2809 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (prefer-
ential treatment statutes will be perceived to be drawn on assumption of racial inferiority
and will exacerbate racial prejudice).
Finally, the lower federal courts frequently address such stigmatic concerns in deciding
hiring and promotion quota cases. See, e.g., Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. Young, 608
F.2d 671, 695-97 (6th Cir. 1979), petition for cert. filed, 48 U.S.L.W. 3466 (Jan. 10, 1980)
(No. 79-1080) (noting difference between effects of hiring and promotional quotas as dif-
ference in likelihood of exacerbating racial hostility); Bridgeport Guardians v. Bridgeport
Civil Serv., 482 F.2d 1333, 1341 (2d Cir. 1973) (noting how promotion quotas may be
more harmful than helpful to blacks because of potential for exacerbating race hostility).
58. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). In Bakke, a state medical school had adopted the practice of
setting aside a fixed number of seats for minority admissions in order to promote, inter
alia, the goal of diversity in the student body. Justice Powell, in his opinion announcing the
judgment of the Court, declared that Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 proscribed
only those racial classifications that would violate the equal protection clause. 438 U.S. at
287. Applying equal protection doctrine to the racial quota system, Justice Powell held it
unconstitutional, emphasizing its severe infringement on personal rights. Id. at 320.
The Brennan-group opinion, including Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and
Blackmun, concurred in Justice Powell's judgment that Title VI's prohibitions are coexten-
sive with the equal protection clause, but differed on the substantive interpretation of the
appropriate constitutional principles to be applied. Id. at 361-62 (Brennan, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part). Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Burger, Stewart, and
Rehnquist, interpreted Title VI to prohibit the Davis quota program, making it unneces-
sary to consider the constitutional issues. Id. at 412 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part).
Like the distinction between affirmative marketing and the preferential program in
United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979), see note 44 supra, there is a
distinction between the affirmative action in Bakke and the affirmative marketing device.
The former achieves its goal by infringing to some extent on the interests of white persons,
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Brennan-group opinion. 59 In that opinion the Justices asserted the
constitutionality of a race-conscious affirmative admissions pro-
gram at Davis Medical School. They argued that the program was
constitutionally valid because it served the legitimate purpose of
overcoming the present effects of past racial discrimination in a
way that avoided stigmatizing any person on the basis of race.6°
The Brennan-group opinion characterized racial classifications as
stigmatizing when "they are drawn on the presumption that one
race is inferior to another" or when "they put the weight of gov-
ernment behind racial hatred and separatism."' 61 Although Justice
Powell explicitly rejected any adherence to the group-stigmatizing
theory in his opinion in Bakke, 62 his approbation of the "Harvard
Plan," in which race is used as a so-called "plus" factor on an indi-
vidual's application,6 3 belies that rejection. A system that considers
race as a plus factor is less restrictive,64 and thus more acceptable,
whereas the latter infringes to some extent on the interests of blacks. Dicta in both the
Powell and the Brennan-group opinions suggest that the Constitution would not permit an
affirmative action program that places a burden on an individual in order to enhance the
societal interests of that person's ethnic or racial group. 438 U.S. at 298, 361.
The underlying constitutional principles set out in the two opinions do not, however,
necessarily mandate an invalidation of the affirmative marketing device on equal protec-
tion grounds. The Brennan-group's test requires a showing that the racial classification
serves an important purpose and avoids stigmatizing individuals on the basis of race. Id. at
361-62. Justice Powell adopts a "personal rights" theory of the equal protection clause and
cites the Harvard admissions plan as one that vindicates the underlying values of his
theory. Id. at 316. In light of the effective differences between the Harvard and Davis
plans, Justice Powell's theory can only be made coherent if read as a substantive equivalent
to the Brennan test. See note 65 infra. This Note argues that an affirmative marketing de-
vice could comply with the constitutional principles enunciated by both the Powell and the
Brennan-group opinions. See pp. 398-99 infra (affirmative marketing device avoids
stigmatizing those black individuals effectively excluded by it).
59. Although Justice Brennan's name appears first in the list of authors, it is clearly in-
dicated that the opinion is to be viewed as if it had been written by each individual Justice.
438 U.S. at 324.
60. Id. at 369-76; cf. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 100 S. Ct. 2758, 2795-97 (1980) (Marshall,
J., concurring) (group-stigmatizing theory as basis for upholding federal public-works
funding that allocated 10% of funds for procuring works projects from minorities).
61. 438 U.S. at 357-58.
62. Id. at 294 n.34. Powell's rejection was based on the view that as a constitutional
principle the stigma theory had no textual basis and was a subjective and thus standardless
test. Id. In addition, Powell pointed out that denying white applicants seats in medical
school based on a quota system would likely produce feelings of mistreatment and unfair
deprivation. In this respect, he implicitly accepts the normative import of the "racial resent-
ment" prong of Brennan's stigma definition and merely disagrees with Brennan as to
whether the Davis admissions program would in fact produce "racial hatred and separa-
tism."
63. See id. at 316-19. The Harvard plan is set out in an appendix to Powell's opinion.
See id. at 321-24.
64. Justice Powell purports to follow traditional strict scrutiny analysis in his invalida-
tion of the Davis plan on the grounds that "less restrictive" alternatives are available. Al-
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than a quota system only in the sense that it is less likely to produce
undesirable stigma. 5 Justice Powell's approach, therefore, in logic
if not in exposition, is best understood as a version of the group-
stigmatizing theory.
The substantive merits of a group-stigmatizing theory are two-
fold. First, it focuses on those underlying values that are of most
concern in an affirmative action context. Rather than scrutinizing
simply the closeness of the fit between means and ends, as in the
strict scrutiny approach, 66 such a theory directs the court's atten-
though he fails to mention explicitly this aspect of the strict scrutiny test, it can be inferred
from the opinion that Powell believes a Harvard-type plan infringes less upon individual
rights than does the Davis plan. See id. at 315-17 (quotas not necessary to achieve diversity
when more flexible opportunities available); cf. id. at 357 (Brennan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (suspect classifications can be justified only when no less restrictive
alternative available).
65. Justice Powell distinguished the Harvard practice of considering race as a "plus"
factor from the Davis quota system on the ground that the former plan treated each appli-
cant "as an individual," id. at 318, and did not totally exclude anyone from a particular seat
solely on the basis of race. See id. (under Harvard plan no candidate "foreclosed from all
consideration" of any one seat because of race); id. at 320 ("fatal flaw" in Davis plan was its
"disregard of individual rights as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment"). The dis-
tinction, however, is illusory. When race may be considered as one factor in the admissions
process, then it may be the deciding factor in a particular case: one candidate may be ad-
mitted ahead of an otherwise more qualified candidate solely because of race. Karst &
Horowitz, The Bakke Opinions and Equal Protection Doctrine, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 7, 8
(1979); see Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 318 (Powell, J.) (acknowl-
edging that candidate may lose out to another solely on basis of race). Assuming that equal
diversity targets are established, the two systems are equally exclusionary.
The main advantage of the Harvard plan is that it is responsive to the problem of group
stigmatization. See Karst & Horowitz, supra at 14-15 (Justice Powell's concern for white resent-
ment aimed at avoiding feelings that Brennan-group characterizes as stigma). Under the
Harvard plan, a numerical quota is not explicitly predetermined, but rather is formulated
less overtly in the process of deciding how great a "plus" to give a minority applicant. See
id. at 9 (admissions committee, in determining how much extra weight to place on race of
minority applicant, must ask itself how much diversity is appropriate). In addition, the
Harvard plan is viewed as achieving the goal of diversity rather than the goal of remedying
past societal discrimination against blacks. Both of these differences mitigate the kind of
feelings of racial hostility and inferiority that the Brennan-group characterized as stig-
matizing. A white denied admission under the Harvard plan cannot complain that he was
totally excluded from certain seats merely because of race. Minority applicants admitted
partly because they add to diversity are being told, not that their race necessitates special
help in the admissions process, but rather that their race is in its own right an asset to the
school.
66. A group-stigmatizing theory would not ignore the necessity of demonstrating some
substantial relation between the racially classificatory means and the end sought. See Re-
gents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 358-59 (Brennan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (benevolent racial classifications "must be substantially related to
achievement" of "important governmental objectives"). Such a test does, however, de-
emphasize the need for close scrutiny of ends and means and focuses more directly on the
substantive results aimed at by the racial classification. One can also view the "substantially
related" aspect of this test as merely vindicating the substantive value of preventing stigma
itself. Any governmental racial classification that is not substantially related to the impor-
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tion to a consideration of potential consequences of affirmative ac-
tion programs that may prove counterproductive to the enterprise
of benefiting minority groups. Such consequences include the pos-
sibility of stamping a minority person with a badge of inferiority
and the chance of exacerbating racial resentment and hostility by
subverting the interests of white persons competing with minorities
for educational, housing, and employment opportunities. Second,
the group-stigmatizing theory fills out the strict scrutiny approach
by describing more precisely the kind of potential harm to the indi-
vidual that can be produced by a race-conscious government pol-
icy. In this way the theory may be viewed as fleshing out the
compelling state interest aspect of strict scrutiny analysis. 67
Applying the group-stigmatizing theory to the affirmative mar-
keting device indicates under what circumstances the device is con-
stitutionally permissible. Under the theory, the most important cri-
terion of constitutionality is whether the device would be likely to
produce racial stigma. A community adopting an affirmative mar-
keting plan would therefore be required at the outset to demon-
strate both that the device would avoid stamping an individual with
a badge of inferiority due to race and that the device would not
spawn racial antagonism.
In addition, the group-stigmatizing theory would necessitate a
demonstration that the affirmative marketing device would in fact
benefit minorities. 68 Several considerations suggest that preventing
residential resegregation and thereby fostering integrated neigh-
borhoods would have beneficial results.
First, both the courts and commentators have affirmed that inte-
tant interest of benefiting minorities must be presumed an invidious and thus stigmatizing
racial classification.
It has been argued that affirmative housing marketing devices similar to the one pro-
posed in this Note would pass constitutional muster under standard strict scrutiny. See
Note, supra note 35, at 952, 961-62. This Note argues for the constitutionality of such a de-
vice, not by fitting it into the traditional categories of the strict scrutiny test, but rather by
arguing that under a new and more appropriate group-stigmatizing test, such a device
would comport with the requisite conditions. See pp. 398-99 infra.
67. Although in the end the group-stigmatizing theory may require some balancing be-
tween governmental and individual interests, it is more explicit in characterizing the type
of individual interest to be protected. The "compelling state interest" aspect of the strict
scrutinv test has been criticized precisely because the courts are given no criteria for
determining what interests are "compelling" enough nor what is the exact nature of the in-
dividual interests against which the governmental interest is weighed. See Note, supra note
53, at 1649.
68. The ends-means scrutiny is not wholly disregarded under the proposed test, see
note 66 supra, but is relegated to less exacting inquiry by the courts. See Regents of the
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 359 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 90: 377, 1980
grated neighborhoods are valuable in their own right. 9 In the long
run, interracial living patterns will help to eradicate persistent ra-
cial hostilities that presently prevent many blacks from advancing
their own social interests. Second, sociologists have thoroughly doc-
umented the evils stemming from segregated housing patterns. 70
Predominantly black neighborhoods often suffer from poor hous-
ing facilities, overcrowding, health hazards, lack of sufficient public
services and utilities, and a general sense of social isolation. 71
Finally, integrated neighborhoods are an appealing tool for main-
taining integrated public schools. Courts and commentators agree
that a primary barrier to integrating public school systems is resi-
dential separation of the races. 72 City officials attempting to fight
de facto school segregation recognize that long term success ulti-
mately depends on reducing residential segregation.73 Even where
substantial school desegregation has been achieved by busing stu-
dents away from neighborhood schools, the costs of this approach,
in terms of time, inconvenience, and energy, make integrated
neighborhoods appear all the more desirable. 74
The requirement of a "substantial relation" between means and
ends would at least necessitate that the use of the device be re-
stricted to situations where it is both necessary and effective in
preventing residential resegregation. 75 A transitional community
using an affirmative marketing device thus would bear the burden
69. See Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 111 (1979) ("'[T]here
can be no question about the importance' to a community of 'promoting stable, racially in-
tegrated housing.' ") (quoting Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S.
85, 94 (1977)); E. GRIER & G. GRIER, supra note 5, at 194-2 18 (describing benefits of inte-
grated communities). In Gladstone, the Court held that the goal of maintaining interracial
living patterns was sufficiently desirable to give a transitional community itself standing to
sue realtors for racial steering practices that threatened the racial balance of that commu-
nity. 441 U.S. at 109-11; cf. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 212
(1972) (granting residents of apartment building standing to sue owner for discriminatory
practices that threatened stability of existing racial balance).
70. See note 4 supra.
71. R. HELPER, supra note 4, at 7-14.
72. See Austin Independent School Dist. v. United States, 429 U.S. 990 (Powell, J., con-
curring), vacating and remanding United States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 532 F.2d 380 (5th
Cir. 1976) (residential segregation creates significant problems for school officials seeking
to achieve nonsegregated district); Hart v. Community School Bd. of Brooklyn, 383 F.
Supp. 699, 748 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), affd, 512 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1975) (racially imbalanced
housing contributes to racial segregation in schools); A. BICKEL, SUpra note 3, at 132 (demo-
graphic conditions render school boards incapable of integrating schools).
73. R. HELPER, supra note 4, at 8.
74. Cf. 125 CONG. REC. H6433 (daily ed. July 24, 1979) (remarks of Rep. Mottl)
(reciting costs of busing in various cities in 1978 in support of antibusing constitutional
amendment).
75. See note 66 supra.
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of demonstrating that without the device the neighborhood would
be likely to turn predominantly black.76 If a community with a sub-
stantial black population is not under an imminent threat of tip-
ping, adoption of the affirmative marketing device would serve no
purpose but to keep more blacks from entering the neighbor-
hood. 77 In addition, the transitional community would have to
show that the device would be an effective means of preventing
resegregation. 8
III. The Affirmative Marketing Proposal
In substance, the proposed affirmative marketing device would
take the form of a law ordering all real estate brokers showing
houses in a transitional neighborhood to adopt certain race-
conscious marketing practices with respect to those houses.79 The
law would mandate that these brokers show at least one house in
the transitional community to all white buyers whose specific hous-
ing preferences can be met by a residence for sale in that commu-
nity. In addition, the law would order the brokers to show black
customers all housing that meets their particular specifications, ex-
cept for houses located in the transitional community.80 Finally, the
law would order real estate brokers to show available houses in the
transitional community to those black buyers who specifically re-
quest to see houses in that neighborhood.
Certain procedural safeguards should be adopted in order to
76. Cf. Parent Ass'n of Andrew Jackson High School v. Ambach, 598 F.2d 705, 718,
721 (2d Cir. 1979) (interpreting Bakke to mandate school board showing that without maxi-
mum quotas on minority students, massive white flight will occur).
77. State action preventing blacks from entering a neighborhood for the sake of segre-
gation has been explicitly held unconstitutional. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 80-81
(1917).
78. Such a requirement stems from the substantial relations aspect of the group-
stigmatizing test. See note 66 supra.
79. The term "transitional" applies to a neighborhood that the state agency has deter-
mined is under an imminent threat of tipping from white to black. See pp. 396-97 infra.
Throughout this Note it is assumed that such a thing as a well-defined neighborhood ex-
ists; some, of course, are better defined than others. See Schelling, supra note 11, at 322.
When a particular community applies for affirmative marketing approval from the state
housing agency, it will have to delineate the boundaries of the area to which the affirma-
tive marketing ordinance will apply.
80. This feature of the affirmative marketing device presupposes that there are other
neighborhoods in which suitable housing can be found. Thus, the device is primarily de-
signed to deal with tipping situations where there are large conglomerations of many
subcommunitics such as exist in the major metropolitan centers of the United States. In
addition, this feature of the device requires real estate brokers to show black buyers all
suitable housing that is available outside the transitional community; it would thus prevent
brokers from simply steering their black customers to predominantly black communities.
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prevent the affirmative marketing device from being misused. A
governmental entity other than the officials seeking to employ the
device should be responsible for evaluating the factual evidence
upon which the legality of the device rests.81 The most appropriate
entity for this purpose would be the state fair-housing agency.
82
Not only would this agency have the most expertise in making the
difficult factual findings on neighborhood transition rates, but it
would also be aware of the housing patterns of the broader geo-
graphic area in which the transitional community is located.8 3 Un-
der this arrangement, the state fair-housing agency would promul-
gate regulations setting out procedures whereby local communities
could secure approval for the use of an affirmative marketing
device.84
When a transitional community, through its town council or local
fair-housing office,8 5 applies to the state agency for affirmative
81. The relevant statutory and constitutional law indicates that the affirmative market-
ing device could be legally employed only if certain factual conditions were first met. A
community seeking to employ the device must demonstrate at the outset that a tipping
threat exists, that a race-conscious device is necessary to prevent resegregation, and that
the device would be effective in curbing the transition process. See pp. 386-88 supra (statu-
tory legitimacy of affirmative marketing depends on whether it is necessary to further
antisegregation policy of Title VIII); p. 394 supra (constitutionality of device depends on its
"necessity" in maintaining residential integration).
82. See EQ. Opp. Hous. (P-H) 2301 (1973) (state fair-housing laws usually provide for
administrative agencies with enforcement authority). In states without fair-housing agencies,
legislation may be required.
83. Macro-level demographic patterns have a significant effect on local neighborhood
transition. Goering, supra note 9, at 71. The probability of tipping varies depending on the
various shifts in black and white demands for housing in the metropolitan areas. Id. An ac-
curate determination of whether a tipping threat exists must therefore take these factors
into account.
84. This procedure would operate in a fashion similar to the affirmative marketing
procedures promulgated by the Department of Housing and Urban Development. See 24
C.F.R. §§ 200.600-.640 (1980). Under these regulations, all applicants for participation in
FHA subsidized housing programs, including private developers, must submit, on a form
supplied by HUD, an affirmative marketing plan indicating how they will comply with the
affirmative marketing regulations. Id. § 200.625. Similarly, the state fair-housing agency
would require the transitional community to supply the requisite empirical evidence estab-
lishing the necessity of an affirmative marketing ordinance in preventing resegregation. See
pp. 397-98 infra.
The state housing agency's determination of the necessity and thus the legality of an af-
firmative marketing device should be subject to judicial review, as are most administrative
agency determinations. The reviewing court would be required to scrutinize the racial clas-
sifications employed by the device to determine if they are necessary to prevent tipping.
The courts have been required in the past to make similar evidentiary judgments. See Par-
ent Ass'n of Andrew Jackson High School v. Ambach, 598 F.2d 705, 720 (2d Cir. 1979)
(judgment whether tipping threat exists); Otero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d
1122, 1137 (2d Cir. 1973) (same).
85. For examples of local fair-housing offices, see U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING AND URBAN
DEVELOPMENT, REGISTRY OF PRIVATE FAIR HOUSING ORGANIZATIONS/GROUPS (1977); cf.
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marketing approval, it would initially have to demonstrate that it is
under an imminent threat of shifting from white to black. Since
transition patterns vary from one community to the next, the mere
assertion that a certain percentage of community residents are
black would be insufficient to meet this requirement.86 Instead, the
community would have to demonstrate to the state agency that the
distribution of individual tipping points87 of white persons in the
neighborhood indicates that the transition process from white to
black would become irreversible unless the number of black resi-
dents was kept below a certain percentage level. 88 Evidence of indi-
vidual tipping points could be produced on the basis of general at-
titude surveys.8 9 In addition, the community would have to dem-
onstrate that the black demand for housing in that area was
sufficient to produce an overall increase in the percentage of blacks
in the community. 90
Once a tipping threat is established, the community would next
be required to demonstrate that the affirmative marketing device
would be effective in preventing residential transition.91 Evidence
indicates that the most important factor in maintaining racial stabil-
Mitchell & Smith, Race and Housing: A Reuiew and Comments on the Content and Effects of Fed-
eral Policy, 441 ANNALS 168, 184 (1979) (recommending that HUD require, as condition to
receiving community development funds, that local communities designate appropriate
community agency to oversee local housing activities).
86. See Goering, supra note 9, at 68-69 (although modern estimates of tipping point
congregate around 25% to 30% blacks, there is no universally accurate point). As
Schelling's model indicates, the rate of transition and the point at which it becomes irre-
versible depend on the distribution of personal tipping points of individual white persons
in the community. See note 11 supra.
87. An "individual tipping point" is defined as the percentage level of blacks in a given
community at which a white decides to leave the neighborhood. See Schelling, supra note
11, at 309-10.
88. See note 11 supra (explaining theory for prediction of neighborhood tipping).
89. See, e.g., Pettigrew, supra note 11, at 25.
90. Evidence of substantial black demand would be established by showing that the per-
centage of black residents in the transitional community had increased steadily since the
first blacks entered that neighborhood. In addition, the community could demonstrate
that, absent some form of race-conscious control, the percentage of blacks would be likely
to increase in the future by showing that predominantly black neighborhoods or other
transitional communities were located nearby. See Goering, supra note 9. at 74 (higher
probability of racial transition for neighborhoods closer to predominantly nonwhite areas).
The community could buttress its case for the existence of an imminent tipping threat by
producing evidence of other factors associated with the tipping process. These factors in-
clude recent declines in the quality and delivery of public services, and real estate broker
activities that encourage the tipping process. See id. at 73-74. The latter lead to an increase
in the number of black persons that buy houses in transitional areas, whereas the former
foster white flight away from the area by generating expectations that the overall quality of
life in the neighborhood will continue to decline.
91. See p. 395 supra.
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ity in transitional neighborhoods is maintaining white buyer de-
mand for housing in that area. 92 The affirmative marketing device
would be likely to promote white demand while simultaneously
curbing any rapid influx of black buyers into the community, and
so would preserve racial stabilityY
3
Most importantly, the transitional community would have to
demonstrate that the affirmative marketing device does not pro-
mote unconstitutional stigma.94 The proposed device minimizes
the chance that anyone would be individually stamped with a
badge of inferiority. Every buyer requesting housing in the transi-
tional community would be shown houses there. People would not
be told that they may not live in a given neighborhood merely be-
cause of their race. Unlike a strict quota, therefore, the effective
exclusion of those black buyers who fail to request housing in the
transitional community avoids stigmatizing them.95
Although the affirmative marketing device may be attacked on
the ground that it produces undesirable stigma by officially
recognizing the white racial fears that contribute to tipping,96 the
92. See C. RAPKIN & W. GRIGSBY, supra note 20, at 52; Goering, supra note 9, at 71.
93. Because the affirmative marketing idea has never been employed as a mandatory
anti-tipping ordinance, evidence that it will be effective at preventing tipping may be diffi-
cult to produce at first. The state fair-housing agency might allow the device to be em-
ployed without an adequate demonstration of efficacy, subject to review after more sub-
stantial evidence has been obtained. The efficacy criterion would also require that the
community demonstrate how the device could be enforced effectively against local real es-
tate brokers. Present fair-housing laws are often enforced through the use of "testers." See
Comment, supra note 23, at 184 (discussing Title VIII case brought through use of testers).
The community could adopt a similar strategy, sending out persons in black and white
pairs to local realtors to "test" whether the real estate broker is complying with the man-
date of the affirmative marketing ordinance.
94. As previously indicated, see pp. 391-92 supra, this criterion is explicitly stated in the
Brennan-group opinion in Bakke, 438 U.S. at 357-58, 361-62. In addition, it may be viewed
as an application of Justice Powell's constitutional test for race-conscious affirmative action
devices. See note 65 supra.
95. Some exclusion of black buyers is necessary in order to prevent a neighborhood
from tipping. The affirmative marketing device is designed to effectuate that exclusion by
forcing real estate brokers to steer those black buyers having no specific locational preferences
away from the transitional neighborhood. By excluding only those black buyers who are
unaware of the exclusion, the device achieves its purpose without producing feelings of ra-
cial inferiority. In this way, the device is more responsive to the courts' concern about stigma
than is the housing-access quota. Given the fact that courts have been willing to allow
quotas for minorities in order to prevent tipping in both public housing projects and pub-
lic schools, see Parent Ass'n of Andrew Jackson High School v. Ambach, 598 F.2d 705 (2d
Cir. 1979); Otero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1122 (2d Cir. 1973), it is likely
that they would accept a device that achieves the same integration goal while simultane-
ously avoiding the stigma problem.
96. See Developments, supra note 7, at 1113; cf. Bittker, supra note 17, at 1419-20 (ordi-
nance mandating 50-50 black-white ratio "is tantamount to an official finding that Whites
will not live side-by-side with Negroes except under legal compulsion"). Blacks might inter-
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community could rebut this objection in several ways. An impor-
tant presumption of the argument for the affirmative marketing
device is that residential integration, with its attendant benefits to
both blacks and whites, would be best promoted by officially
recognizing racial succession as a fact of metropolitan life, what-
ever the underlying attitudes and motivations. 97 Similarly, the in-
crease in racial cooperation and understanding that often ac-
companies interracial living patterns98 arguably offsets any bol-
stering of racist beliefs that might attend government recognition
of those beliefs. Indeed, the harmful stigmatization that may result
from an affirmative marketing device is slight compared to the
stigmatizing effect produced both by residential segregation itself
and by the process of residential resegregation. Finally, the local
fair-housing agencies that would likely be responsible for imple-
menting the affirmative marketing device are normally engaged in
pro-civil rights activities, an engagement that belies any official "ap-
proval" of the racial fears that produce white flight.99
Conclusion
The stable, integrated neighborhood is an important means of
promoting racial harmony in America. Unfortunately, such com-
munities are uncommon because of widespread neighborhood ra-
cial transition. This Note proposes an affirmative marketing plan
for housing in transitional neighborhoods in order to curb that tip-
ping process. The proposed plan, because it is a race-conscious de-
vice, necessitates facing facts with both eyes open. Reverse steering
recognizes race and racism alike. It does so, however, in a way that
achieves racial equilibrium in the local community without creating
undue and unconstitutional racial stigma.
pret invocation of the device as an official acceptance of the racist attitudes at the heart of
white flight. In this way, the adoption of the ordinance itself, rather than the manner in
which it applies to individual buyers, might be viewed as stamping blacks with a badge of
inferiority. Moreover, this seeming approval might become a self-fulfilling prophecy,
perpetuating racial fears. See Kaplan, supra note 7, at 393.
97. See A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 60-61 (1962) (housing quotas pursue
end of residential integration in hope that racial prejudices may be eradicated).
98. See E. GRIER & G. GRIER, supra note 5, at 194-218 (describing positive attitudes of
people living in stable integrated communities).
99. Fair-housing agencies are often set up pursuant to state laws, with the purpose of
promoting the enforcement of fair-housing practices against local real estate brokers. See J.
WINKER, W. ScoT, D. DE\MARCO, & D. ONDERDONK, supra note 19, at 10.1.
